





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ESTABLISHING A RATIONAL NEW ZEALAND / UNITED STATES DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

by

Wing Commander Richard J. Newlands, AFC, RNZAF

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Establishing a Rational New Zealand/United States Defense Relationship

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Since the New Zealand government introduced nuclear-free legislation in 1987, New Zealand has effectively been expelled from the ANZUS Treaty which linked Australia, New Zealand and the United States in a defense alliance. Although diplomatic and political relationships have essentially returned to normal, cooperation in the defense arena remains curtailed. With the end of the Cold War and the associated U.S. declaration that U.S. Navy surface ships no longer carry nuclear weapons, part of the cause for the defense fissure has been eliminated, leaving only the nuclear power issue remaining in contention. The U.S. policy of "cooperative engagement" has seen the U.S. military exercising with former foes Russia and India. In light of this, and the pursuit of common international goals by New Zealand and the United States, there appears to be good reason for increasing defense cooperation between the two countries, without necessarily restoring links under the ANZUS Treaty.

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Introduction

In the period since New Zealand signed the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and the United States in 1951, successive New Zealand governments have seen this security alliance as being the cornerstone of New Zealand's defense policy. The three partners in the ANZUS alliance built up a strong relationship based upon a common background and mutual concerns in international affairs and security. However, in response to growing concerns by the New Zealand public about the morality of nuclear weapons and the safety implications of nuclear power, the newly elected New Zealand Labour government in 1985 introduced its policy which banned nuclear weapons and power plants from New Zealand's territory. This policy was later enshrined in legislation. As a result of the "neither confirm nor deny" policy in force by the U.S. government, this legislation had the effect of precluding U.S. ships from entering New Zealand ports. The nuclear issue aroused very strong emotions at the time, and resulted in the United States effectively expelling New Zealand from the ANZUS alliance. Mis-understandings on the part of both governments fuelled the fallout in relations between the two nations. The intransigent positions taken relating to security issues substantively remain to this day, in spite of the significant changes in the international system since the mid-1980s. These changes have seen the U.S. conducting exercises with former Warsaw Pact enemies, while exercises with a previous ally, New Zealand, are forbidden.

Most people acknowledge the dramatic upheaval that has occurred in the international environment over the past decade, but with the passage of time many overlook the circumstances in which New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance was shaped. Seven years after New Zealand's exclusion from operational aspects of the ANZUS alliance it is time to review the basis of the relationship between New Zealand and the United States. New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance must be viewed from the context of the nation's historical approach to defense and security. The development of the anti-nuclear policy and the U.S. reaction to it both then and in the current

international circumstances are critical to this review. This essay will analyze the current defense policies of both New Zealand and the United States to find both the common ground and outstanding issues. The thesis of this paper is that there is further room for movement in establishing a more rational approach to the New Zealand/United States security relationship, without necessarily restoring links under the ANZUS Treaty.

Background to New Zealand's Security Posture

New Zealand was established as a British colony in 1840, following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi by representatives of the Maori inhabitants and the British Crown. Self government was established in 1856, and in 1907 New Zealand became an independent dominion within the British Empire.

The majority of New Zealanders were migrants from Great Britain, and in the best traditions of the empire both nations developed a sound mutual economic relationship. From 1882 when New Zealand shipped the first frozen meat to England, the majority of New Zealand's trade was with Britain, mainly as primary agricultural produce. New Zealand's bulk export trade with Britain developed significantly from this period onward, and formed the basis of an economic prosperity that was to endure for 80 years and rank the country as one of the world's wealthiest per capita by the 1960s.¹

In the early days the remoteness of New Zealand, coupled with preoccupation with surviving in the pioneering environment, dominated the thinking of the settlers. External security was of little concern. New Zealanders first developed a (somewhat exaggerated) sense of security threat in the 1880s. Not unnaturally in its circumstances, New Zealand came to recognize its primary avenue of defense as being a commitment to, and drawing upon, colonial protection.² This approach resulted in significant New Zealand contributions to the Boer War in 1899 - 1902, and the two World Wars from 1914-18 and 1939-45 respectively. Support for imperial defense

was seen in 1900 as a means to gain a voice in imperial government.³ An indication of the commitment to imperial defense was the support provided to Britain in World War I. From a population of only 1.2 million, a total of 103,000 New Zealanders served abroad. Of these 18,500 died and 50,000 were wounded.

New Zealand demonstrated its support for imperial defense again when the government declared war against Nazi Germany simultaneously with Britain in 1939. At the time of the declaration of war the New Zealand Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Michael Savage, reflected the view of New Zealanders when he stated:

*Behind the shield of Britain we have enjoyed and cherished freedom and self-government. Both with gratitude for the past, and with confidence in the future, we range ourselves without fear beside Britain. Where she goes, we go. Where she stands, we stand. We are only a small and young nation, but we are one of a band of brothers, and we march forward with a union of hearts and wills to a common destiny.*⁴

Of the World War II allies, only Russia called up a greater proportion of its citizens for armed service.⁵ A total of 194,000 New Zealanders served during World War II, representing almost 25% of the total male population at the time. New Zealand casualties were 11,625 dead and a further 17,000 wounded. These casualty rates also were proportionately amongst the highest of the allied forces excepting Russia.⁶

In 1942 when Japan overran East Asia and expanded into the Pacific, New Zealand (for the first and only time) faced the prospect of military invasion. At the time, with its forces committed in Europe, New Zealand stood virtually defenseless. Unlike Australia who recalled her forces from Europe to fight in the Pacific, New Zealand complied with British requests to leave her forces in the European theater. New Zealand therefore raised a further contingent which was dispatched to the Solomon Islands. This so denuded New Zealand's manpower strength that the

almost 60,000 American troops rotating through New Zealand throughout the Pacific War provided the only significant force in country for New Zealand's home defense.

The impact of the United States action in turning back the Japanese in the Pacific was to leave a deep impression on New Zealanders that lasted for many years to come. In the period after the war, both the New Zealand and Australian governments were keen to develop a security alliance with the United States, to whom both countries began to look as their primary ally. These initiatives resulted in the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. Although it gave no guarantees of military support other than "to consult," the ANZUS Treaty came to be seen (at least until 1985) as the cornerstone to New Zealand's defense policy, and New Zealand's forces exercised frequently with her ANZUS allies both at home and abroad.

In the 1960's and 70's New Zealanders began to gain a greater sense of national identity. The reasons for this were many and varied, but involvement in the highly corrosive Vietnam War left a lasting impact on New Zealanders. The position was well summed up by Prime Minister Norman Kirk early in 1973:

The new international situation makes it essential for small countries like New Zealand to stand on their own feet. The danger of war has receded, essentially because the great powers are disengaging themselves from areas of actual or potential conflict. This means that small countries can no longer rely on them as heavily as in the past but must in the future be more self-reliant We shall look at every question from the point of view of New Zealand's interests and New Zealand's concerns in the world

Naturally we shall work in partnership with those who share our views. But our actions must be our own. Our policy will be a policy of independence.⁷

Ironically, it is the ANZUS controversy which perhaps more than any other single factor has proved to be the catalyst for the emergence of a deeply held sense of New Zealand independence. It is not that New Zealanders are anti-American, nor that they shirk from pulling

their weight in an alliance; it is that today they reserve the right to decide, as Norman Kirk suggested, what New Zealand's interests are. Increasingly, New Zealanders resent having the views of larger nations over-riding their own judgements. It is in this sense that the nuclear ship visits controversy has become part of New Zealand's sense of national identity.⁸

As a small and remote nation, New Zealand has been a strong proponent of collective security.⁹ New Zealand initially placed little faith in the ability of the League of Nations to perform the ambitious role that had been set for it, but her support strengthened markedly from 1935 onwards.¹⁰ Support for the League's successor, the United Nations, has been no less strong. Significant support for collective security continues to this day. New Zealand is currently serving on the Security Council for a two year term, has been active in introducing and supporting measures to further enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations as an organization, and has been an active supporter of U.N. peacekeeping operations.

As a member of the world order, New Zealand committed troops in the 1950s and 60s to United Nations sponsored operations in Korea, and to British and United States led operations in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. Peacekeeping forces have been committed in the Sinai desert, along the Iran/Iraq border, in Somalia and Sarajevo. An air force transport element and two medical teams were also committed in the Gulf War.

There was a slight shift in New Zealand public opinion in matters of defense and security during the past decade, with a trend toward - but not to - isolationism. This was not a conscious change in approach, but is probably a reflection of the nuclear debate and its fall-out throughout the 1980s, in combination with the relatively benign environment in our region. It is also undoubtedly a function of the low priority that New Zealand governments throughout the period gave to defense matters as they struggled to correct significant problems with the economy.

However, the election of a National government in late 1990 saw a return to a more enlightened approach to the country's security needs, with an increased commitment to collective

and alliance security. This was reflected by the incoming National government decision in late 1990 to send a small air force and medical contingent in support of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf (ostensibly in a non-combatant support role), compared to the previous decision by the outgoing Labour government not to send any forces. The attitude of the new National government was perhaps best encapsulated by the new Foreign Minister, Don McKinnon, when he stated in 1991:

I am conscious that New Zealand has been pushed a long way into the 'peace' camp, and I feel it is one of our duties as a government - and mine as Foreign Minister - to pull us back to where we should be, to a position we feel more comfortable with. . . . So for the time being it is highly unlikely that New Zealand would be involved in a combat contribution anywhere in the world other than on our own back doorstep. If in one year's time, some other mad person in some part of the world - and it could be very close to us - causes problems, the New Zealand public, following the Gulf crisis, might be more attuned to what world peace and order is all about.¹¹

This view has been further reinforced in the most recent New Zealand defense review, conducted in 1991, which remains current as government policy. This policy stresses the need for "self reliance in partnership" with other friendly nations and clearly espouses New Zealand's view that:

Isolationism makes less sense than ever for a country with trading and other interests which range across the globe. It reaffirms also New Zealand's long-standing reliance on collective security. Many of our major international interests are shared with others and can only be advanced in cooperation with them. We have seen a recent instance in the Gulf. Playing our part in alliances and other collective endeavours does not subordinate New Zealand's interests; it is often the best means of promoting them.¹²

The Nuclear Issue

Notwithstanding New Zealand's engagement in international affairs, in the past two decades New Zealanders began to change their security outlook. There were a number of reasons for this. New Zealanders began to express doubts about the morality of the nuclear deterrent, and in particular the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). While many could understand the role nuclear weapons played in deterrence, the extent to which allied doctrine was based on the use of nuclear weapons to overcome deficiencies in conventional forces worried New Zealanders. They also had difficulty coming to terms with the escalation in stockpiles of nuclear weapons that seemingly went far beyond the requirements for deterrence. The superpowers went from 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons at the time of the signing of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to some 23,000 at the time of the Soviet Union's fall. This contrasts with the spirit of the NPT in which the nuclear powers promised, in Article 6 of the treaty, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the nuclear arms race at an early date."¹³ The nuclear powers were given an opportunity which they squandered. Is it any surprise that non-nuclear states began to consider other initiatives to work toward the non-proliferation goal?

The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence also came into question. Much had been said (and still is) to assert that nuclear deterrence had kept the peace between the super-powers. But it did not prevent the United States from being tipped out of Vietnam, nor stop the Russians trampling on the people of Afghanistan. And the attitude that led to the quest for a ballistic missile defense system, as well as the tendency to talk loudly about nuclear warfighting, did as much to undermine popular confidence in nuclear deterrence as any of the actions of the anti-nuclear campaigners.¹⁴ Nonetheless, it is not the purpose of this paper to debate the efficacy of nuclear deterrence: it serves the purpose here simply to point out that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons was not universally accepted, and this viewpoint was a factor in New Zealand's security outlook.

As a result of these changes in the New Zealand outlook, anti-nuclear sentiment began to build. This became particularly evident during visits to New Zealand by United States naval ships (both those that were nuclear powered and those that were potentially nuclear armed). Protesters staged significant demonstrations when these ships visited, and the public at large began to sympathize with the anti-nuclear movement. While it was not always clear whether the concerns were related to just nuclear armed vessels, or to nuclear powered vessels also, the developing sentiment resulted in the New Zealand Labour Party taking an anti-nuclear stance at least as early as 1972.

During the term of the Labour government from 1972-75 New Zealand maintained an executive (rather than legislative) ban on visits by nuclear-powered warships, although the ban had more to do with 'who would pay' in the case of accident than with philosophical problems with nuclear propulsion or weapons. The ban was lifted in 1976 by the new Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, after the passage of U.S. Public Law 93-513 in 1974 (which allowed for compensation for reactor - but not weapon - accidents) and after discussion with a delegation from the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. The ban was lifted because it was inconsistent with New Zealand's obligations as a signatory to the ANZUS treaty.¹⁵ Although these bans did not please the U.S. government, the reaction was more orderly than the reaction to legislation that was to come a decade or so later.

The first area in which New Zealand's developing aversion to nuclear weapons began to take on a legislative form came with the move toward development of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone. Although the South Pacific treaty did not come to fruition until 1985, the first tentative moves toward a nuclear free South Pacific were made under the leadership of the New Zealand Labour government at meetings of the South Pacific Forum in 1975. These and later proposals sponsored by the Australian government in 1983 were driven by concerns of South Pacific nations about the possibility of the breakdown of the nuclear peace and an unchecked

qualitative-cum-quantitative proliferation of nuclear weapons among nuclear-weapon states. The spread of strategic weapons doctrines, nuclear weapons deployments and nuclear testing to the South Pacific were also central to the concerns of the Pacific states.¹⁶

The second nuclear weapon free zone in an inhabited region (after the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco that established the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) was established at the sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting in Rarotonga on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The preamble to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty expresses a commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for halting nuclear proliferation.¹⁷

Activities of most concern to nuclear powers were little effected. The treaty did not ban the transit of nuclear weapons through the zone area or impinge on the rights of states to permit port visits by nuclear-armed ships. Nor did the treaty touch on command, control and intelligence facilities in Australia and New Zealand. Nonetheless, although provision is made for ratification of specific articles of the treaty by nuclear powers, and even though both the USSR and China ratified the treaty, the United States officially announced on 4 February 1987 its decision not to sign the treaty protocols. This approach harmed American interests in the South Pacific by needlessly antagonizing regional countries on one of the few issues on which they felt strongly. More particularly, it undermined larger American non-proliferation interests by reducing pressure on other countries to conclude local nuclear-weapon-free zones in such high-risk regions as the Middle East and South Asia. It is interesting and not a little contradictory of non-proliferation goals that the principal reason given for continued United States rejection of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was fear of strengthening calls for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.¹⁸ It is only more recently that United States analysts have begun to recognize the promise that nuclear-free zones show in the non-proliferation field.¹⁹

A turning point in New Zealand's security relationship with the United States came when the Labour Party was elected to power in late 1984. The Labour government was sympathetic to the rising anti-nuclear sentiment throughout the country, a significant number of the party if not of the government being committed to removing any association between New Zealand and nuclear matters. For some this was an arms control issue, for others a moral question, and for others a purely pragmatic issue; New Zealand was safer without any contact with such weapons and anything New Zealand did to restrict them was good for New Zealand.²⁰

In a poll to evaluate support for anti-nuclear legislation at about this time, around 60 percent of New Zealanders polled wanted to ban nuclear power and weapons from New Zealand territory. In the same poll, a similar proportion stated a desire to remain in a security alliance of some sort. The Labour government, naively as events were to show, believed it could ban nuclear weapons and nuclear powered warships from New Zealand ports while remaining a member of the ANZUS alliance.

The question of visits by a nuclear capable warship was forced by the U.S. government on 27 January 1985 when it asked for the conventionally powered USS *Buchanan* to visit New Zealand. Although the Prime Minister, David Lange, was inclined to allow the ship to visit, he was over-ruled by his cabinet. The Prime Minister announced the turndown of the Buchanan request on 4 February, although he stated New Zealand would remain committed to the ANZUS alliance.²¹

Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger characterized the New Zealand stance as a serious attack on the alliance. The U.S. responded by suspending cooperation with New Zealand in training, military courses and exercises, and sharply curtailing intelligence shared with New Zealand. The U.S. position was essentially that its allies could not impose special conditions on their security relationships.

The nuclear debate developed further, and anti-nuclear legislation was introduced to parliament. The Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act of 8 June 1987 bans nuclear weapons and power from New Zealand territory. Under the legislation foreign ships and aircraft may visit New Zealand only if the Prime Minister, assisted by a public advisory committee, is satisfied that no nuclear weapons are on board. Nuclear propelled ships are not permitted to visit New Zealand.

The United States Response and its Implications for New Zealand

The United States considered that New Zealand was welching on its obligations as an ally, and that its actions had the potential to weaken the position of the West's nuclear deterrence. The problem stemmed directly from the New Zealand governments effective denial of normal port access and from its initiative in moving to put its ban on nuclear ships into law. This latter aspect, that of legislating the policy, seems to have particularly offended the United States administration.

The concerns about legislation particularly relate to the position of U.S. allies Japan, Denmark and Norway who maintained that they did not allow nuclear-armed vessels into their ports while allowing access to U.S. warships that (prior to 1991) almost certainly were nuclear armed.²² However, as there was no legislation in place to enforce the policies of these nations, it was up to the goodwill of the visiting nations as to whether this policy was abided by or not. New Zealand, in its desire to maintain its sovereignty, was not prepared to make a mockery of its anti-nuclear policies. Legislating the policy was seen as a means to ensure compliance.

Following New Zealand's passing of the nuclear-free legislation in 1987, the United States responded by formally suspending ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand (for which there is no provision in the treaty) and Secretary of State George Shultz declared that New Zealand would henceforth be seen as "a friend, not an ally".²³

The ramifications of New Zealand's changed status were wide ranging. Official high-level political and military contact with the U.S. ceased. New arrangements were required for provisioning spares for U.S. sourced military equipment; the exchange of intelligence ceased; and all training, personnel exchange and exercise activities were halted. This had a significant impact on the New Zealand armed forces, and particularly on the Air Force that had until that point had closer ties with the U.S. services than either the Army or Navy.

The changes in the relationship with the U.S. were particularly felt at the operational level of the services. Undoubtedly the lack of the large scale training opportunities previously available under ANZUS had an adverse impact on the operational readiness of the New Zealand defense forces. As a result, greater emphasis was placed on exercises with Australian forces, which partially filled the gap. This created difficulties for Australia in its continuing, now bi-lateral, defense relationship with the United States, however. New Zealand forces could not be invited to exercises in Australia when U.S. forces were participating, a factor that further served to limit the training opportunities available to New Zealand forces.

Current Status of the New Zealand/United States Relationship

Restrictions on the New Zealand/United States security relationship continue to this day. The United States Department of Defense is particularly intransigent in its viewpoint, as was shown as recently as 21 April 1993 during testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee by the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command, Admiral Charles Larson. When asked by Senator Levin whether, in light of the fact that the United States has removed nuclear weapons from U.S. naval vessels, should it not be possible to resume normalized relations with New Zealand, Admiral Larson replied:

Senator, the problem with New Zealand is much deeper than nuclear weapons on ships.

It is a two-pronged problem. One is they have a law against nuclear propulsion, and

ships with nuclear propulsion making calls in their ports. The second one is the anti-nuclear weapons legislation.

*In my view, it would be wrong for us to move forward and establish a relationship with an ally that is only a fair weather ally. You know, we will stick with you as long as you meet our conditions, but if a crisis occurs in the world then we will not be your friend any more.*²⁴

As was shown earlier, New Zealand has proved to be much more than a fair weather ally. New Zealand has stuck by the United States throughout the past half century (including on some occasions, such as Vietnam, when arguably it should not have).

On the political/diplomatic front there has been a gradual thawing of U.S.-New Zealand relations. This first became evident toward the end of the Labour government's term of office when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker ended a U.S.-imposed freeze on high-level meetings when he met the then Minister of External Relations and Trade, Mike Moore, in Washington on 1 March 1990. This policy reversal was due in part to pressure from the chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Stephen Solarz, who prodded the administration describing as a "most indefensible anomaly" the fact that officials were "toasting the butchers of Beijing" but refusing to meet leaders from one of only about eight nations that have consistently lived under a democratic system of government - New Zealand.²⁵ However, an inadvertent outcome of the meeting between Minister Moore and Secretary of State Baker was that it precipitated a switch on 8 March 1990 by the National Party, then in opposition, to support the nuclear ban.²⁶

More recently U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the U.S. government had reviewed its overall policy to New Zealand. He stated:

We continue to press for eventual change in those impediments that New Zealand has imposed which prevent alliance relations, while recognizing that our two

countries have important business to conduct outside defense relations. To advance that goal, we have decided to restore senior-level contacts between U.S. officials with their New Zealand counterparts for discussions on political, strategic and broad security matters.

Our decision to restore senior-level contacts does not signify a restoration of our previous alliance with New Zealand under ANZUS nor does it foreshadow adjustments in other areas of our previous security cooperation that have been curtailed.²⁷

This improvement in relations is welcome in all quarters, but it does not address the disconnect between the security policies of the two countries and re-establish a rational defense relationship.

Outstanding Issues

What then are the outstanding issues that are preventing the resumption of closer ties in the defense field? The primary issue centres around the anti-nuclear legislation and its impact on U.S. naval visits to New Zealand ports. Here there are two sub-issues: nuclear weapons and nuclear powered ships. The nuclear weapons issue has hinged around the "neither confirm nor deny" policy of the U.S. However, President Bush's announcement in 1991 of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from U.S. naval surface ships amounted to a reversal of the "neither confirm nor deny" policy, and satisfies New Zealand legislative requirements for permitting visits by U.S. conventionally powered vessels.

The sticking point remains, therefore, the issue of nuclear powered vessels. In response to this concern, the National government of Prime Minister Jim Bolger in 1992 initiated a study into the safety of nuclear powered ships. This extensive review found that:

The presence in New Zealand ports of nuclear powered vessels of the navies of the United States and the United Kingdom would be safe. The likelihood of any damaging emission or discharge of radioactive material from nuclear powered vessels if in New Zealand ports is so remote that it cannot give rise to any rational apprehension.

In addition to five other major findings, the report also noted that there is a serious lack of understanding and knowledge, and much misinformation, in the minds of the public concerning safety and technical issues related to nuclear powered vessels.²⁸ The problem for the National government is that polls indicate that almost 75% of New Zealanders do not favor amending or repealing the legislation. In view of their narrow electoral margin in the November 1993 election, the government can ill-afford to raise the ire of a large portion of the New Zealand electorate by moving too fast on this issue. Considerable informed debate will need to ensue before public opinion is likely to change on the nuclear issue. Nonetheless, the New Zealand government continues to remain engaged in international security affairs.

But how much of a hindrance is the nuclear power ban? The U.S. currently has seven nuclear powered and seven conventionally powered aircraft carriers. There are seven (soon to reduce to four) nuclear powered cruisers in a total fleet of thirty cruisers. All other surface combatants are conventionally powered. Other nuclear powered naval vessels are the twenty one ballistic missile firing submarines and eighty seven attack submarines, all of which are nuclear powered. There are no plans to build more nuclear powered cruisers or smaller surface combatants.²⁹ Ignoring the submarines for the moment, in a fleet of around four hundred surface ships, seven nuclear powered carriers and soon to be four nuclear powered cruisers is a small ratio. In a small country such as New Zealand, where port facilities are relatively limited, it would not be difficult to schedule visits of conventionally powered vessels only.

Submarine port visits are a more ticklish issue. At present, no U.S. submarine is permitted to enter New Zealand ports, as they are all nuclear powered. However few U.S. submarines

visited New Zealand ports when they were permitted to, as there are no facilities for servicing submarines in New Zealand, so this issue is of relatively minor concern.

Toward a Rational New Zealand/United States Defense Relationship

What then is the longer-term interest of the U.S. on this issue? An important element of the U.S. security strategy is what the Commander in Chief Pacific Forces, Admiral Charles Larson, calls "cooperative engagement". This includes "fostering an environment conducive to multi-national cooperation in solving security challenges".³⁰ A significant element of cooperative engagement is the development of strong alliances in peacetime to promote engagement and participation through a wide variety of military activities. The aim of cooperative engagement is to increase interoperability with allies and open channels to friendly countries. An example of the application of this policy was the conduct of naval exercises with both Russia and India for the first time last year.³¹ Other aims of cooperative engagement include building on strong alliances and bi-lateral relationships to sustain military stability and economic growth, and fostering an environment conducive to multi-national cooperation in solving security challenges.³²

In terms of military operations, the U.S. seeks to cooperate more fully with other nations, both to share the cost and load, particularly in an era of reducing defense budgets and capabilities, and also to gain greater international support for military actions. In this respect the current situation between the United States and New Zealand is most unhelpful. The U.S. policy of isolating New Zealand from exercises where combined operations are practiced has a detrimental effect on the ability of New Zealand forces to interoperate with U.S. and other allied forces. An associated impact of this is that any New Zealand decision to provide forces to operate alongside U.S. forces is noticeably less likely. This was undoubtedly one factor in the New Zealand decision not to provide combat forces in the Gulf War.

The United States also has established significant non-proliferation goals. The central theme of the U.S. non-proliferation policy is that it seeks to prevent additional nations developing a nuclear weapons capability. This policy can be seen in action with respect to North Korea, Iraq and Pakistan. It therefore appears incongruous that it pursues a policy of punishment against an ally for taking a firm stand by example in furthering non-proliferation goals. If the U.S. honestly seeks to promote world-wide non-proliferation then its policy toward New Zealand is somewhat hypocritical. This is especially so in the post-Cold War era.

Summary and Conclusions

New Zealand adopted its nuclear-free legislation in 1987 because of what New Zealanders considered to be legitimate concerns about the nuclear arms race and its impact on New Zealand security. These and other issues resulted in a ban on both nuclear weapons and nuclear power. The primary United States concern at the time was that of the ban on nuclear weapons because it conflicted with the U.S. "neither confirm nor deny" policy. Enshrining the nuclear ban in legislation rather than simply maintaining a stated policy (which presumably could be more easily ignored or circumvented) seems to have further raised the ire of U.S. officials. The U.S. unilaterally withdrew cooperation with New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty, and ceased official diplomatic and military contacts between officials.

Since the breakdown in the relationship, major changes have occurred which have impacted on the international security outlook. The most significant of these was the end of the Cold War. As a result of this the United States reversed its "neither confirm nor deny" policy and declared in 1991 that nuclear weapons were being removed from all U.S. Navy surface vessels. This should have brought about a solution to the defense impasse between New Zealand and the United States, but instead it saw a shift in focus toward both the nuclear power and legislation issues.

In the interim there has been an almost complete thawing in diplomatic relations between the two nations. This move is welcomed by all concerned, and is a reflection of the shared values and interests of New Zealand and the United States. However the defense impasse remains.

The main impact of the impasse is to degrade the operational readiness of the New Zealand armed forces through a loss of larger scale, multi-threat exercise opportunities. This in turn has degraded the ability of New Zealand forces to operate with allies in operations ranging from peacekeeping to armed conflict.

There appear to be a number of contradictions in the U.S. policy toward New Zealand in the defense arena, and it is time to take another look at the New Zealand/United States security relationship. There are many good reasons for ending the current stalemate, not the least of which is the United States national interest in cooperative engagement. It is rather ironic that under the strategy of cooperative engagement a past enemy, Russia, receives better treatment than a former ally, New Zealand.

Resolution of the defense impasse is in the best interests of both nations. Both New Zealand and the United States work closely on international issues, ranging from peacekeeping to trade. And although each goes about achieving its objectives by a slightly different route, both have clearly espoused non-proliferation goals. With much in common, there should be room for manoeuvre on the defense issue.

It is probably too much to expect a resumption of the former relationship under the ANZUS treaty. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not move on that issue while the New Zealand anti-nuclear legislation remains in force. However, if the U.S. can willingly exercise with former foes such as Russia and India, is it too much to expect New Zealand participation in military exercises that include United States forces? Such exercises would be in line with the U.S. "cooperative engagement" strategy, and would enhance the interoperability of New Zealand forces. That would encourage New Zealand to commit further to international coalitions to aid

international security. Such a change of policy would help to overcome the impediment to New Zealand armed forces operating in concert with others.

When New Zealand forces participate in international or coalition forces, whether in combatant or peacekeeping operations, the lack of realistic large scale and multi-national exercises available to them leaves them short in exposure to the combined operations in which they are required to operate internationally. If for no other reason, this should be a sufficiently compelling reason for two historically democratic, western aligned nations to work more closely together to achieve common security objectives. Extending the policy of cooperative engagement to include exercises with New Zealand forces would go a long way in meeting this goal.

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